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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order reducing the 
state's felony stalking charge to a misdemeanor. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Paul C. Hartzell with stalking, elevated to a felony 
because Hartzell's actions were in violation of a no-contact order from Asotin 
County, Washington. (R., p. 63.) The district court ordered the charge reduced 
to a misdemeanor, reasoning that differences in the Washington and Idaho 
statutes allowing no-contact orders made the Washington order inapplicable for 
enhancement of the stalking charge. (R., pp. 1 08-11.) The state timely 
appealed. (R., pp. 117-19.) 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by concluding that violation of an out-of-state no-
contact order does not serve to enhance a stalking charge? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Violation Of An Out-Of-State 
No-Contact Order Does Not Serve To Enhance A Stalking Charge 
A Introduction 
The district court concluded that differences in Idaho's and Washington's 
no-contact order statutes meant that the victim in this case could not have 
obtained a no-contact order pursuant to I.C. § 39-6303 and therefore the 
defendant's violation of the Washington no-contact order could not serve to 
enhance the stalking charge. (R., p. 11 0.) The district court erred as a matter of 
law as there is nothing in the stalking statute that suggests that when a no-
contact order issued in another jurisdiction is violated the order must be issued 
pursuant to a statute substantially conforming to I. C. § 39-6303. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P .3d 1115, 1117 (2004 ); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. The Felony Stalking Charge Is Supported By Probable Cause Because 
The Plain Language Of The Stalking Statute Applies To Hartzell's Conduct 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the 
best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a 
3 
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 14 7 Idaho 
326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). Where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written. 
Mclean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 
(2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one reasonable 
interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that interpretation. Verska 
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, _, 265 P.3d 502, 
508-09 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect 
to unambiguous language of statute if such was "palpably absurd"). 
Stalking is in the first degree, and therefore a felony, if it is committed "in 
violation of a temporary restraining order, protection order, no contact order or 
injunction." I.C. § 18-7905(1)(a). The state charged that the stalking committed 
by Hartzell was "in violation of a civil protection order issued on September 26, 
2011, in Asotin County Case Number DV11-72." (R., p. 63.) Thus, the state 
clearly charged a felony stalking according to the plain language of the statute. 
The district court reasoned that, because the defendant and the victim did 
not have a domestic relationship, the victim could not have obtained a protection 
order under I.C. § 39-6303, and therefore Hartzell's conduct was not in violation 
of a protection order. (R., pp. 109-10.) Nothing in the language of I.C. § 18-
4 
7905(1)(a), plain or otherwise, says anything about I.C. § 39-6303. 1 Nor does 
the statute say anything about similar or conforming statutes from different 
jurisdictions. Indeed, the legislature used the expansive language "temporary 
restraining order, protection order, no contact order or injunction," expressing 
clear legislative intent that the stalking statute not be limited just to orders issued 
under I.C. § 39-6303 or equivalent statutes. The district court's order reducing 
the charge to a misdemeanor is erroneous because it is incompatible with the 
plain language of I.C. § 18-7905. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order reducing the stalking charge to a misdemeanor. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2012. 
KENNETH K. JO N 
Deputy Attorney Gen al 
1 The district court does note that the phrase "household member" appears in 
another subsection of the stalking statute. (R., p. 11 0.) But that subsection was 
not charged and is irrelevant to this inquiry. At best, the inclusion of the phrase 
"household member," in a different subsection indicates that if the legislature had 
intended such a limitation in the relevant part of the statute it could have included 
it there. 
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